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Is government involvement in the
functioning of the economy beneficial
or damaging for society? This endlessly
debated question is as relevant now as
it has ever been with the enormous
packages of ‘fiscal stimulus’ that have
been implemented to ward off a deep
recession, plus the likelihood of
stronger regulation of financial markets
in the hope of preventing future crises.
This CentrePiece features research
findings from the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) that provide support
for both sides of the argument. For
example, proponents of reduced
intervention may appreciate studies of
‘occupational licensing’ – work that
requires government permission. These
find that it has few benefits and major
costs for users of the services provided
by the occupations, which include
dentistry, accountancy and the law.
Supporting domestic industries
against foreign competition is a form
of government intervention more
widely agreed to be damaging. At a
time when trade has declined
dramatically, there is a real danger that
countries will respond with
protectionist measures, such as the ‘Buy
in America’ provisions of the US fiscal
stimulus. Frédéric Robert-Nicoud and
Richard Baldwin explain why industrial
policy tends to pick ‘losers’, a finding
that is particularly topical in light of
the bailout of the US car industry.
But governments can also have
positive effects on people’s lives. Our
cover story and ‘big ideas’ article in this
issue describe the evolution and impact
of minimum wages in Britain – from
the first enactment of trade boards
exactly one hundred years ago through
to the establishment of the National
Minimum Wage in the late 1990s. The
consensus view across the political
spectrum is that the policy has been a
success, benefiting 12 million low paid
workers and reducing wage inequality.
This policy is also indicative of the
potential benefits of government
support for research. The Economic and
Social Research Council (ESRC), which
recently awarded CEP £6.08 million
over a five-year period, commissioned a
consultancy report aimed at measuring
the impact of its funding. Focusing on
the Centre’s contribution to the
implementation and evaluation of the
National Minimum Wage, the report
tried to assess the value of CEP
research, concluding that:
‘Of course, it is impossible to
attribute with any precision the value
generated, but if we start with a gross
benefit of £1.2 billion attributed to the
policy then even if only 2% of that
gross benefit is attributable to CEP that
equates to £24 million in 2008 prices.’
As ever, your comments on this
magazine are welcome. Much more on
CEP research can be found on our
website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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A
cademics in general and
academic economists in
particular are often
accused of being in an
ivory tower, of doing
research of no practical relevance, perhaps
claiming they are doing deep thinking but
in reality writing on questions that are of
interest only to a few like-minded
eccentrics. When called on to offer insight
into something like the current economic
crisis, this line of criticism runs, they have
little to say that is of value.
But most academic economists are not
like that. They are interested in changing
the way people think and, through that,
to make the world a better place. And the
‘people’ are not just academics: eventually
an idea must reach the mind of someone
outside academia if it is to have any
impact on the world.
At CEP, we have never lost sight of
this goal as our series of ‘big ideas’ aims
to demonstrate. This ‘big idea’ is the story
of the interplay between academic
research and policy that has resulted in the
UK’s National Minimum Wage. It is written
from the perspective of someone who was
involved in this process.
Some historical background
and intellectual context
In 1909, Winston Churchill established
‘wages councils’ to protect the pay of
workers in the so-called 'sweated' trades.
The wages councils set minimum wage
rates in a number of different industries.
This system remained in place for over 80
years (covering varying numbers of
industries over that period), even surviving
Mrs Thatcher’s onslaught on labour
market regulation (though subject to some
changes).
But by the early 1990s, abolition of
the wages councils had become a policy
of John Major’s government. The
argument was that, as the wages councils
raised wages, they must necessarily reduce
employment, though no evidence was put
forward in support of this view. That was
the point at which my CEP colleague
Stephen Machin and I became interested
in the subject.
The wider background to the debate
over the future of the wages councils was
the agenda of deregulating labour
markets pursued by Mrs Thatcher and her
successors. The basic argument used was
simple but, nonetheless, powerful: that
anything that raised wages must reduce
employment and the most efficient labour
market would be one that was completely
deregulated.
The arguments typically deployed
against this view struck me as particularly
weak and ineffective, generally conceding
the efficiency losses caused by labour
market regulations but defending them on
grounds of equity. But appeals to equity at
that time seemed to carry less and less
weight.
I wanted to provide a stronger general
intellectual foundation for some form of
labour market regulation. Starting in
1990, I became convinced that
The UK’s National Minimum Wage arguably represents the Labour
government’s most significant intervention in the labour market. In the
latest contribution to CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series, Alan Manning describes
the Centre’s role in providing the intellectual context for the policy,
advising on its implementation and evaluating its impact.
Big ide
The UK’s 
National Minimum Wage
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‘monopsony’ is the appropriate way to
think about labour markets. In essence,
the idea is that in many circumstances,
employers have considerable discretion to
set wages. So the view that the labour
market is close to the economist’s ideal of
a ‘perfectly competitive’ market is simply
wrong. This line of research eventually led
to my book Monopsony in Motion
(Manning, 2003).
In a monopsonistic labour market,
regulation is not necessarily harmful for
employment. In the context of the
minimum wage, the argument is that
while a minimum wage might hurt the
profitability of firms and reduce their
demand for labour, it also increases 
the returns to work for workers so they
might be expected to increase their supply
of labour.
The argument that minimum wages
must always cost jobs is based on a view
that employment is determined solely by
labour demand. The monopsony view
suggests that the supply of labour might
be as important if not more so, especially
in low-wage labour markets.
But ‘monopsony’ is no idealistic view
of the world: it suggests clear limits to
what can be expected to be achieved by
regulation in general and the minimum
wage in particular. If the minimum wage
were raised too much, there is no doubt
that employment would fall. So ultimately
it is evidence – not abstract theory – that
should determine what are the likely
effects of labour market regulation.
The fight to save 
the wages councils
During the 1990s, while I saw making the
case for some labour market regulation as
the big picture, the fight over the abolition
of the wages councils was the first place
these ideas got an airing in the policy arena.
Looking back, our early research on
the impact of the wages councils on
employment was based on some
incredibly poor data but it was the best
that was then available. The first published
study concluded that there was no
evidence that the activities of the wages
councils had cost jobs (Machin and
Manning, 1994).
In the run-up to the 1992 general
election, at a time when opinion polls
suggested that the Labour Party might
win, the Financial Times wrote an article
about this research, causing the Chief
the minimum wage should take 
(Manning, 1997). 
My CEP colleague David Metcalf was
one of the founding members of the Low
Pay Commission, which first reported in
June 1998, recommending a single
minimum wage for all adults aged 22 and
over and a lower rate for those aged 18-
21. Most importantly, the case was
strongly based on evidence (in line with
wider government commitments to
‘evidence-based policy-making’), a
considerable part of which was research
that had been done at CEP.
The initial rate was set at a modest
level of £3.60 per hour, reflecting a feeling
that it was best to start low and evaluate
its effects rather than run the risk of
setting it too high. Employers and their
lobbying organisation, the Confederation
of British Industry (CBI), were very
concerned about job losses, and the Bank
of England was worried about the
potential effect on inflation.
From the beginning, the Low Pay
Commission took an evidence-based
approach, commissioning research on the
impact on employment and other
outcomes. All the initial studies failed to
find any adverse effect of the minimum
wage on employment. As a result, in
subsequent years, the rate was raised
faster than average earnings, and
coverage was extended to younger
workers. Metcalf (2008) and Brown 
(2009) provide excellent overviews of 
the research.
The impact on wage
inequality
My interest in the minimum wage is now
about its effects on wage inequality. In
studies written with Richard Dickens, we
find that the minimum wage raised the
wages of those who would otherwise
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Executive of Grand Metropolitan (a
company with large interests in low-wage
sectors like pubs and fast-food
restaurants) to call the Director of the LSE
to complain.
But the Conservatives won the
election and the 1993 Trade Union Reform
and Employment Rights Bill made good on
their manifesto promise and abolished the
remaining 26 wages councils. As a result,
there were no longer minimum wages in
any sector except agriculture, leaving the
UK as the only European Union country
without a formal or informal system of
minimum wages.
Our research continued, much of it
now with our CEP colleague Richard
Dickens, writing papers about the effect of
abolition (Dickens et al, 1993; Dickens and
Manning, 1995) and using better data to
assess the effects of the wages councils
(Dickens et al, 1998, 1999).
Our central message was that the
abolition of the wages councils had been
a mistake – but it also represented an
opportunity. There was no doubt that the
wages councils had been anachronistic in
many ways, covering obscure industries
whose names (such as ‘coffin and
cerement making’) conjured up images of
their origins in Victorian Britain. The
Labour Party under the leadership of 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown did not
propose a return to the wages councils –
instead, they suggested a new National
Minimum Wage.
The introduction of a National
Minimum Wage became Labour Party
policy while still in opposition. The
Conservative government, aided by some
sympathetic academic economists, argued
that it would cost millions of jobs if
introduced. These estimates were not
based on any study of an actual minimum
wage in operation but, in large part, a
product of the simple assumption that a
minimum wage had to cost jobs. 
The Low Pay Commission
and the birth of the National
Minimum Wage
Following the Labour Party’s victory in the
1997 election, the introduction of the
National Minimum Wage became
government policy. But rather than
legislate directly, the new government set
up an independent Low Pay Commission
in July 1997 to make recommendations 
on the appropriate form and level that 
The ‘monopsony’
view of labour
markets provides
a rationale for
regulation in
general and the
minimum wage
in particular
have been paid below it, but that there
were no ‘spillovers’ onto the wages of
workers who would have been paid more.
And because the modest initial level of the
minimum wage affected relatively small
numbers of workers (perhaps about 7%
of the workforce), the effect on overall
wage inequality (and wage inflation) 
was modest (Dickens and Manning,
2004a, 2004b).
But the UK has seen a remarkable fall
in wage inequality at the bottom end of
the wage distribution in recent years. The
gap between the median and the tenth
percentile of the hourly wage distribution
fell by about 8 log points in the ten 
years after 1997, reversing the rise in
inequality seen in the decade prior to
1997 (though not undoing the increase
since 1979).
It is an interesting question why this
has happened, and it is tempting to
believe that part of the answer must be
the National Minimum Wage. But this can
only be true if we think that the minimum
wage has some effect on the wages of
workers who are paid above the
minimum. Richard Dickens and I are
currently investigating whether this has
been the case.
The National Minimum
Wage today
The UK’s National Minimum Wage is here
to stay. Although the Conservative Party
abolished the wages councils and fought
the introduction of the minimum wage,
they no longer propose to remove it. In an
interview in the Guardian in 2005, David
Cameron, then the new leader of the
Conservatives, said 'I think the minimum
wage has been a success' and 'it turned
out much better than many people
expected, including the CBI'.
In a 2008 lecture, the shadow
chancellor, George Osborne, said that
‘modern Conservatives acknowledge the
fairness of a minimum wage’. And the
Conservative Mayor of London, Boris
Johnson has supported a ‘living wage’ for
London, essentially a higher minimum
wage to take account of higher living
costs in London.
Many people have contributed to
making the National Minimum Wage the
success it is generally perceived to be
today. Through careful, non-ideological
research, academic economists have
played their part. 
CentrePiece Autumn 2009
5
Further reading
William Brown (2009) ‘The Process of Fixing
the British National Minimum Wage,
1997-2007’, British Journal of Industrial
Relations 47: 429-43.
Richard Dickens, Paul Gregg, Stephen
Machin, Alan Manning and Jonathan
Wadsworth (1993) ‘Wages Councils: Was there
a Case for Abolition?’, British Journal of
Industrial Relations 31: 515-30.
Richard Dickens, Stephen Machin and Alan
Manning (1998) ‘Estimating the Effect of
Minimum Wages on Employment from the
Distribution of Wages: A Critical View’,
Labour Economics 5: 109-34.
Richard Dickens, Stephen Machin and Alan
Manning (1999) ‘The Effect of Minimum
Wages on Employment: Theory and Evidence
from Britain’, Journal of Labor Economics
17: 1-23.
Richard Dickens and Alan Manning (1995)
‘After Wages Councils’, New Economy 2:
223-27.
Richard Dickens and Alan Manning (2004a)
‘Has the National Minimum Wage Reduced
UK Wage Inequality?’, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society Series A 167: 613-26.
Richard Dickens and Alan Manning (2004b)
‘Spikes and Spillovers: The Impact of the
National Minimum Wage on the Wage
Distribution in a Low-wage Sector’,
Economic Journal 114: C95-101.
Stephen Machin and Alan Manning (1994)
‘Minimum Wages, Wage Dispersion and
Employment: Evidence from the UK Wages
Councils’, Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 47: 319-29.
Alan Manning (1997) ‘What Variation should
we have in the National Minimum Wage’, in
Implementing a National Minimum Wage in
the UK, Employment Policy Institute.
Alan Manning (2003) Monopsony in Motion:
Imperfect Competition in Labour Markets,
Princeton University Press.
David Metcalf (2008) ‘Why has the British
National Minimum Wage had Little or 
No Impact on Employment?’, Journal of
Industrial Relations 50: 489-512.
Alan Manning is professor of economics at
LSE and director of CEP’s research
programme on labour markets.
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on, the UK’s
National
Minimum 
Wage is widely
perceived to 
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A
ny employee
working in Britain
who is over 
21 will be entitled,
from 1 October
2009, to an hourly
wage of at least
£5.80. Behind this simple fact – of
considerable comfort for very many of
today’s less well-off workers – lies not only
a decade of work by the Low Pay
Commission, but a hundred years of
controversy, progress and regress since the
first minimum wage was introduced.
For this year marks the centenary of
the passage through Parliament of the
Trade Boards Act 1909. It fell to Winston
Churchill, as President of the Board of
Trade in the reforming Liberal government
of the time, to introduce the bill on 
24 March 1909, and pilot it through
opposition and amendments until 
20 October when it became law.
This statute was not the first enactment
of minimum wage legislation in the
modern era: similar laws had been passed
in Australia and New Zealand in the 1890s.
But among the larger nations, this was a
first, and it heralded waves of twentieth
century wage regulation around the world.
The original model
The Trade Boards Act of 1909 empowered
the relevant government ministry of the
day, the Board of Trade, to set up a board
in any industry in which wage rates were
‘exceptionally low compared with that in
other employments’. The trade boards
resembled joint negotiating bodies, 
with representatives of employers and
workers from the trades concerned and
some independents.
To begin with, only four industries
were regulated: ready and bespoke
tailoring, paper box making, lace finishing
and chain-making. The powers of the first
Trade boards – precursors of the wages councils
and today’s National Minimum Wage – were first
enacted one hundred years ago in October 1909.
Simon Deakin and Francis Green trace the
legacy of a century of minimum wages in Britain.
A century of 
minimum wages 
in Britain
6
boards were strictly confined: they could
only set minimum hourly rates and
equivalent piece rates. Nevertheless, for
those covered, mainly women, it was
effective in raising living standards and
reducing poverty.
An expansion of the trade boards’
functions and numbers followed after the
First World War. By 1921, there were over
40 boards in place, covering three million
workers in Britain, and a parallel system
was to follow in Northern Ireland. The
model was that the boards should do
what, in other circumstances, was done
through collective bargaining. Later the
boards’ powers were extended to include
regulation of holiday entitlements.
The reforming Wages Councils Act
1945 was based on the premise that the
state should use its powers not simply to
ameliorate the effects of ‘sweating’
(extreme low pay and casualisation of
employment) but to ‘keep collective
bargaining going when economic
circumstances tended to destroy it’. 
The trade boards became ‘wages
councils’. At this point, approximately one
in four of all workers were covered by
statutory regulation.
These first minimum wages in Britain
had emerged after a long period of
activism in protest against the ‘sweating’
of labour, especially among women. And
yet, the model fell a long way short of
establishing a universal legal entitlement
to a minimum wage.
In their 1897 book Industrial
Democracy, Beatrice and Sidney Webb
had argued for ‘a systematic and
comprehensive Labour Code, prescribing
the minimum conditions under which the
community can afford to allow industry to
be carried on; and including not merely
definite precautions of sanitation and
safety, and maximum hours of toil, but
also a minimum of weekly earnings’.
But the solution arrived at by 1945
was a compromise that involved the
expansion of wages councils alongside
government encouragement for industry-
level, multi-employer bargaining.
After the Second World War
The wages councils system struggled to
maintain its legitimacy in the post-war
years. The prevailing view was that the
retention of statutory controls was holding
back the development of voluntary
collective bargaining. Several wages
councils, covering around half a million
workers, were abolished in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
In the 1980s, the policy pendulum
moved decisively in the direction of labour
market deregulation. The Wages Act 1986
removed the powers of the wages councils
to set more than basic time and piece
rates, in the process eliminating all
statutory paid holiday entitlements.
Complete abolition of the remaining 
26 councils followed in 1993. 
This time of retreat on regulation
coincided with a renewal of economic
analysis of the effects of minimum wages.
Against the then-prevailing economists’
view that raising wages induced employers
to reduce employment (the extent of loss
depending only on the elasticity of labour
demand), new models of the labour
market claimed to represent the reality of
many low-skilled labour markets better
than the textbook model of perfect
competition. The idea of ‘monopsony’ 
(see previous article) introduced a
substantial element of ambiguity, even
suggesting that moderate rises in
minimum wages would increase
employment, because of their positive
effects on labour supply.
Simultaneously, advances in empirical
research techniques and the availability 
of new sources of data revealed instances
of minimum wage increases in the 
United States that induced only very
modest changes in employment, either
positive or negative. In Britain, research 
on the wages councils was finding no
beneficial employment increases from 
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proponents 
of a national
minimum wage,
argued that it
could help
realign Britain’s
industrial
structure with
the wider
interests of
society
The 1998 National Minimum 
Wage Act owes much to the original
trade boards model of 1909
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raising the statutory minimum is no longer
the policy goal of preserving the voluntary
collective bargaining system, but the
perceived need to minimise what are seen
as potentially negative economic effects.
One positive outcome of the intense
interest in the effects of minimum wage
regulation over the past decade has been
the growing sophistication of social
science research on this subject.
Theoretical arguments are more rigorous
and realistic than they used to be, while
new data sources have been used in an
imaginative way.
The research generated by the Low
Pay Commission, and the use made of it,
has been one of the better examples of
evidence-based policy-making: it has
supported the attempt to rationalise the
process of setting the rate of the
minimum wage. The consensus view from
a wide range of empirical studies is that its
introduction has not had the negative
employment effects that orthodox
economic theory predicts.
Aside from this, some dissident
economists put forward a ‘social cost’
argument in favour of a national minimum
as originally advanced by the Webbs. 
The minimum wage removes the 
artificial subsidy that low pay provides to
inefficient firms, and which in an
‘unregulated’ system is borne by other
firms and the community at large. In this
way, it removes an externality and realigns
the industrial structure with the wider
interests of society.
This argument has featured more in
debates in continental Europe than in
Britain. A century on from the first Trade
Boards Act, perhaps the time has come to
look again at the Fabian argument for the
‘public organisation of the labour market’.
This article summarises the introduction to a
special issue of the British Journal of
Industrial Relations (47: 2, June 2009),
which celebrates the centenary of 
the Trade Boards Act 1909 with a selection of
papers from several countries
(http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/
journal/122382753/issue).
Simon Deakin is professor of law at the
University of Cambridge. Francis Green is
professor of economics at the University of
Kent and a visitor at CEP.
the reductions in wages that had taken
place throughout the 1980s. 
The legacy
With the new Labour government of
1997, the National Minimum Wage Act
1998 was enacted. There was now a
statutory National Minimum Wage 
binding on all employers regardless of
their sector. It was to be complemented 
by the European Directive on Working
Time, which, among other things, 
required re-regulation of the provision of
paid holidays.
But the 1998 Act owes much to the
wages council system, even more to the
original trade boards model of 1909 and
rather less to the Webbs. The tripartite
structure of the Low Pay Commission is in
a direct line of descent from the
arrangements put in place for the trade
boards. As in 1909, the 1998 Act and the
related National Minimum Wage
Regulations 1999 contain no power to set
the minimum wage at a level that reflects
living costs. There is no statutory
mechanism for automatically uprating the
minimum wage with price increases.
These arrangements contrast with
statutory minimum wage regulation in
some other European countries, most
notably the French model of the
‘minimum growth wage’ (the salaire
minimum interprofessionel de croissance,
SMIC). The law governing the SMIC,
which has been in force since 1970, links
the minimum rate to price inflation, and
also makes provision for it to be raised
each year by at least half the increase in
the value of the purchasing power of the
average wage. 
In contrast to the earlier models,
however, the principal constraint on
As in 1909,
the 1998 Act
contains no
power to set the
minimum wage
at a level that
reflects living
costs or price
inflation
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Heterogeneous firms 
in international trade
International trade is dominated by firms selling multiple
products to multiple destinations. Research by Peter Schott
(Yale School of Management) and colleagues examines
the production and export decisions of these firms and
how they are affected by globalisation. In his keynote
presentation to the conference, he showed that much of
the variation in aggregate trade between countries is
accounted for by the ‘extensive margins’ of trade – the
number of exporting firms, the number of exported
products and the number of export destinations.
Trade liberalisation raises firms’ productivity by inducing
them to focus on their ‘core competencies’ in their
leading products. Therefore, the reallocation of resources
in response to events such as trade liberalisation may be
even more important than hitherto thought insofar as it
occurs within as well as across firms.
Further theory and evidence on the role of multi-product
firms in understanding the volume and pattern of trade
was presented by Peter Neary (University of Oxford) and
colleagues and by Costas Arkolakis (Yale University) and
Marc Muendler (University of California, San Diego).
Other papers presented at the conference explored the
dynamics of firm exporting. Recent empirical research has
found that between one third and one half of all
exporters are new entrants in a typical year. These new
entrants are, on average, much smaller than incumbent
exporters and the majority of them exit within a year.
Nonetheless, those new exporters that do survive grow
rapidly and as a result account for a substantial proportion
of aggregate export growth over longer time intervals. 
Emanuel Ornelas (CEP) and colleagues presented theory
and evidence on ‘sequential exporting,’ in which firms
enter one export market in part to obtain information
about their profitability in other export markets. Costas
Arkolakis (Yale University) presented a unified model of
firm selection and growth that can account for both the
cross-section dispersion of firm size and the dynamics of
firm growth and survival over time.
Another theme of the conference was the impact of trade
liberalisation on wage inequality and unemployment. In
research with Elhanan Helpman and Oleg Itskhoki, 
I presented a new framework for examining the
distributional consequences of globalisation, which
emphasises heterogeneity across workers and 
firms, labour market frictions and firm selection into
export markets.
Within this framework, the opening of trade increases
wage inequality and unemployment in both developed
and developing countries, because only the most
productive firms export and these exporters pay higher
wages and are more selective in their recruitment policies
than non-exporters. Once the economy is open to trade,
further trade liberalisation can either increase or decrease
wage inequality and unemployment, depending on the
initial level of trade openness.
Another dimension through which globalisation can affect
wages and employment is offshoring. Guru Sethupathy
(Columbia University) presented a paper in which lower
offshoring costs raise profitability and wages at offshoring
firms relative to those at non-offshoring firms. Perhaps
surprisingly, domestic employment can rise at offshoring
firms because the increase in efficiency from offshoring
expands their employment and offsets the direct loss of
offshored jobs. In contrast, domestic employment
necessarily falls at non-offshoring firms, which lose market
share and contract.
Using the Mexican Foreign Investment Law of 1993 and
the peso crisis in 1994 as natural experiments that
changed the marginal cost of offshoring to Mexico, the
study provides empirical evidence in support of these
predictions.
This article summarises the issues and papers discussed at a
conference on ‘Heterogeneous Firms in International Trade’, jointly
organised by CEP, CESifo and the Norface partnership between 
14 European research councils, held in Venice in July 2009
(http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/
c-event/c2conf/30confvsi).
Stephen Redding is director of CEP’s research programme 
on globalisation (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/research/
globalisation/default.asp).
Research in international trade increasingly focuses on firms and
products as well as countries and industries. Stephen Redding reports
on a recent conference to discuss the latest findings.
in brief...
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E
conomists have long
speculated on why there are
such astounding differences
in the productivity
performance between firms
and plants within countries, even within the
same narrow sector. While business schools
have long stressed the importance of
different management practices, empirical
economists have had relatively little to say
about management. A major problem has
been the absence of high quality
management data that is measured in a
consistent way across countries and firms.
To address this lack of management
data, we have been refining and
implementing a methodology that
measures management practices (Bloom
and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, Sadun and
Van Reenen, 2008). We use an interview-
based evaluation tool that defines and
scores 18 basic management practices
from one (‘worst practice’) to five (‘best
practice’). This evaluation tool was
developed by an international consulting
firm, and scores these practices within
three broadly defined areas:
 Monitoring: how well do companies
track what goes on inside their firms
and use this for continuous
improvement?
 Target setting: do companies set the
right targets, track the right outcomes
and take appropriate action if the two
don’t align?
 Incentives: are companies promoting
and rewarding employees based on
performance and systematically trying
to hire and keep their best people?
To obtain accurate responses from
firms, we interview production plant
managers using a ‘double-blind’
technique. Managers are not told they are
being scored or shown the scoring grid;
they are only told they are being
‘interviewed about management practices
for a research project’. To run this blind
scoring, we use open questions.
For example, the first monitoring
question is ‘tell me how you monitor your
production process’, rather than ‘do you
monitor your production daily [yes/no]’.
We continue with open questions
targeting actual practices and examples
until the interviewer can make an accurate
assessment of the firm’s practices. For
example, the second question on
performance tracking is ‘what kinds of
How important are management practices in
driving the performance of firms and the
productivity of nations across Asia, Europe and
North America? Survey data collected and
analysed by Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen
is providing many new insights into the
economics of management and productivity.
Bossonomics:
the economics of 
management and productivity
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Figure 1:
Management practice question number 4 
(‘Performance tracking’)
Scoring grid Measures tracked do
not indicate directly 
if overall business
objectives are being
met. Tracking is an 
ad hoc process 
(certain processes aren’t
tracked at all).
Most key performance
indicators are tracked
formally. Tracking is
overseen by senior
management. 
Performance is
continuously tracked
and communicated,
both formally and
informally, to all staff
using a range of visual
management tools.
Example firm A manager tracks a
range of measures
when he does not think
that output is sufficient.
He last requested these
reports about eight
months ago and had
them printed for a
week until output
increased again. Then
he stopped and has not
requested anything
since. 
At a firm every product
is bar-coded and
performance indicators
are tracked throughout
the production process.
But this information 
is not communicated 
to workers.
A firm has screens in
view of every line, to
display progress to daily
target and other
performance indicators.
The manager meets
daily with the shop
floor to discuss
performance metrics,
and monthly to present
a larger view of the
company goals and
direction. He even
stamps canteen napkins
with performance
achievements.
2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
China
Greece
India
Brazil
Portugal
Rep. of Ireland
Poland
Northern Ireland
Great Britain
Italy
France
Canada
Japan
Germany
Sweden
United States
The bars indicate for each country the average score on the 
18 management questions (1=worst practice, 5=best practice).
Figure 2:
US firms have the best management practices on average,
and those in developing countries like Brazil, China and
India the worst
measures would you use to track
performance?’ Figure 1 shows the scoring
grid for this performance tracking
dimension.
The other side of the double-blind
technique is that interviewers are not told
in advance anything about the firm’s
performance. They are only provided with
the company name, telephone number
and industry. Since we randomly sample
medium-sized manufacturers (employing
between 100 and 10,000 workers) who
are not usually reported in the business
press, the interviewers generally have not
heard of these firms before, so have no
preconceptions.
To ensure high sample response rates
and skilled interviewers, we hired MBA
students to run interviews. We also
obtained government endorsements for
the surveys in each country covered, and
positioned it as a ‘lean manufacturing’
interview with no requests for financial
data. These steps helped to yield a 45%
response rate.
Management practices
across firms and countries
Figure 2 plots the average management
practice score across countries from the
6,000 interviews we carried out in survey
waves between 2004 and 2008. It shows
that the United States has the highest
management practice scores on average,
Management practices seem to play 
an important role in determining
country-level productivity
with the Germans, Japanese, Swedes and
Canadians grouped together below this,
followed by a block of mid-European
countries (France, Italy, the UK and
Poland), with Southern Europe and
developing countries – Brazil, China,
Greece and India – at the bottom.
In one sense, this is not surprising
since it approximates the cross-country
spread of productivity. But in another
sense, it suggests that management
practices could play an important role in
determining country-level productivity. 
At the firm level, better management
practices are strongly associated with
higher firm-level productivity, profitability
and survival, suggesting they could play 
an equally important role in country-level
productivity.
Better management is also linked with
improved employee work-life balance and
lower energy use, suggesting better
management does not come at the
expense of worker welfare or more
pollution (Bloom, Kretschmer and Van
Reenen, 2006; Bloom, Genakos, Martin
and Sadun, 2008).
Of course the key question is why do
management practices differ across
countries? Figure 3 plots firm-level
management practices by country, and
shows that management practices display
tremendous within-country variation. So,
much like productivity figures, within-
country variation is far greater than cross-
country variation. 
Figure 3 also highlights that US firms
have the highest average management
score because they have almost no density
of firms with management practices below
two. In comparison, India, which has the
lowest cross-country management score,
has a large mass of firms with extremely
poor management practices (scores of two
or less).
This raises two key questions on which
we are currently working: why are there
these variations in management practices;
and to what extent do variations in
management practices cause variations in
productivity? 
Why do management
practices vary so much
across firms and countries?
We have identified three key factors that
appear to play an important role in
shaping management practices –
competition, family ownership and
multinational status.
Product market competition is
associated with significantly better
management practices. In particular, the
tail of badly managed firms shrinks in
highly competitive markets. Thus, the
competitive product markets of the United
States explain much of its lack of badly
managed firms. In contrast, many product
markets in India have limited competition
because of entry barriers, trade regulations
and high transport costs, enabling badly
managed firms to persist.
We are currently investigating the
mechanisms through which competition
works to improve management. One
possibility is Darwinian selection – high
levels of competition should drive badly
managed firms out of business more
quickly. Another is by inducing higher
levels of effort – tough product market
competition may lead managers to work
harder as the stakes are higher (slacking is
CentrePiece Autumn 2009
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Three factors play a key
role in shaping
management practices –
competition, family
ownership and
multinational status
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The charts show the distribution of firm level management scores (1=worst practice, 5=best practice) within each country.
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
fi
rm
s
Figure 3:
Distribution of firm-level management practices
by country, showing few badly managed firms in
the United States (a small left tail) and many
badly managed firms in developing countries
like India (a large left tail) 
more likely to lead to losses of market
share and bankruptcy). As we follow up
the initial cross-sectional firm surveys to
convert this into panel data, we can
investigate these different mechanisms.
Firms that are both family owned and
family managed tend to be badly run on
average. This is true even after including
controls for country, industry, firm size,
skills and capital. Looking at these family
firms in more detail, it appears that the
worse managed firms are those that hand
down the position of CEO using the
ancient practice of primogeniture
(succession of the eldest son).
To elicit this information, we asked
the plant managers the question ‘How
was the CEO chosen, was he selected as
the eldest son or by some other
mechanism?’. In many countries,
including Brazil, India and the UK, the
answer was often selection by eldest son,
while in other countries, such as the
United States and Sweden, this was very
rare. A number of factors, including
traditions over leadership succession,
inheritance tax breaks and the external
market for CEOs, appear to drive these
differences.
Private equity-owned firms are
significantly better managed than family
firms. They have strong people
management practices (hiring, firing, pay
and promotions) but even stronger
operations management practices (lean
manufacturing, continuous improvement
and monitoring), which suggests that
private equity ownership is associated
with broad-based operational
improvements in management rather than
just stronger performance incentives
(Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009).
Multinational and export status also
appear to play an important role in
determining a firm’s management
practices. One stylised fact is that
multinationals have good management
practices wherever they are located – so
multinationals in Brazil, India and the
United States all appear to be well run.
A second stylised fact is that some
countries have relative managerial
strengths and weaknesses – for example,
the Japanese are better at monitoring and
the Americans at incentives and people
management – and their multinationals
take this with them abroad. We show
that US multinational affiliates located in
Europe are able to use their managerial
advantage to make better use of
information technology to raise
productivity (Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen, 2008).
We argue that these managerial
differences could account for about half
of the superior productivity growth
performance in the United States relative
to Europe in the decade after 1995. A
third stylised fact is that among domestic
firms, those that export are better
managed than non-exporters.
Future directions 
for research
We have also been collecting and
analysing information on firm organisation
such as decentralisation and delayering.
Working with Raffaella Sadun and Luis
Garicano, we have been analysing how
organisational structures are shaped by
culture and information and
communications technology. In other work
with Christos Genakos, we have been
using longitudinal data to look at how
changes in labour market regulation, skills
and competition drive changes in
management practices. 
Finally, we have been collaborating
with international organisations to develop
randomised control trials to evaluate the
causal impact of management practices on
firm performance. Governments spend
billions of dollars on business support
programmes to improve management
with little evidence on whether this has
any effect.
Working with Benn Eifert, David
McKenzie, Aprajit Mahajan and John
Roberts, we have started the first wave of
field experiments employing an
international consulting firm to provide
management assistance to a random set
of Indian firms and evaluate their
performance against a control group.
Identifying the causal impact of
management practices on firm
performance will start to allow us to
estimate the impact of the differences in
management practices on firm and
national productivity.
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Nick Bloom is an associate professor of
economics at Stanford University and a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. John Van Reenen is
director of CEP.
Further reading
Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen (2007)
‘Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices across Firms and Countries’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4):
1351-1408 (earlier version available as CEP
Discussion Paper No. 716: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0716.pdf).
Nick Bloom, Christos Genakos, Ralf Martin
and Raffaella Sadun (2008) ‘Modern
Management: Good for the Environment or
Just Hot Air?’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 891
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0891.pdf).
Nick Bloom, Tobias Kretschmer and John Van
Reenen (2006) ‘Work-Life Balance,
Management Practices and Productivity’, CEP
Special Paper No. 16 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/special/
wlbmanagementpractices.pdf).
Nick Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van
Reenen (2008) ‘Americans do I.T. Better:
US Multinationals and the Productivity
Miracle’, EDS Innovation Research
Programme Discussion Paper No. 15
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
EDSInnovationResearchProgramme/
pdf/EDSdp015/edsDP015.pdf).
Nick Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van
Reenen (2009) ‘Do Private Equity Owned
Firms Have Better Management Practices?’,
CEP Occasional Paper No. 24
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
occasional/op024.pdf).
Managerial differences
could account for 
half of the superior
productivity growth in the
United States relative to
Europe after 1995
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U
nemployment increased
substantially across the
world after the sharp oil
price rises of the 1970s
and the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates. But unlike many other parts of the
world, unemployment in many European
countries never returned to the low levels
seen during the Golden Age after the
Second World War. 
Why did European unemployment
remain stubbornly high? The standard
explanation is that industrialised
economies became more unstable and
more frequently subject to shocks – such
as oil price rises or exchange rate
fluctuations – from the 1970s onwards.
Those countries with flexible labour
market institutions – such as modest
unemployment benefits, light employment
protection legislation and a low degree of
union power – managed to absorb the
effects of these shocks much better than
those with rigid institutions (Blanchard and
Wolfers, 2000).
The rise in the number of jobless in
most European countries is therefore
attributed to the interaction between
shocks and institutions. But it remains
difficult to identify the precise nature of
these shocks. In recent research, I argue
instead that a decline in the work ethic,
induced by the expansion of the welfare
state, is key to understanding European
unemployment.
It has long been recognised that
generous unemployment benefits create
‘moral hazard’ – workers are partly
protected against the consequences of
being unemployed, so they are less 
likely to search for jobs with the same
intensity. But the size of the moral hazard
problem depends on the values that
individuals hold.
People with a strong work ethic would
find it unacceptable to rely on benefits
without actively looking for jobs, while
others with weaker values try to remain
on benefits for as long as possible. So the
average values in a country have an
impact on the size of the moral hazard
problem and hence on the cost of
providing generous unemployment
benefits. We would expect countries
where workers have a weaker work ethic
to have a lower ‘replacement ratio’ – the
level of benefits relative to wages.
To measure the work ethic in different
countries, I use the World Values Survey,
From the 1970s, unemployment across 
Europe increased substantially. Research by
Jean-Baptiste Michau argues that a declining
work ethic is key to understanding this rise.
European 
unemployment:
how significant was a 
declining work ethic?
which consists of harmonised questions
asked in every decade since 1980 to a
representative sample of individuals in
many countries. One question is
particularly useful for evaluating a
country’s work ethic: ‘Please tell me
whether you think it is always justified,
never justified or something in between to
claim government benefits to which you
are not entitled’.
The analysis shows that there are large
differences in answers across countries,
even within Western Europe. These persist
after filtering out the effects of age,
gender, political orientation and religion on
individual answers. Using France as a
baseline, for a person with average
characteristics, being Danish rather than
French increases the probability of
answering ‘never justifiable’ to the question
by 32%. Being British increases it by 24%;
while being Greek decreases it by 5%.
Figure 1 indicates that there is a
positive correlation between the number
of people who think it is ‘never justifiable’
to cheat on benefits and the replacement
ratio of unemployment benefits. This
suggests that the strength of values
affects policy and that when the moral
hazard problem is too strong, the
provision of benefits is reduced.
But values change over time and could
be affected by government policies – for
example, a work-shy culture could result
from high levels of unemployment benefit.
To understand the true nature of the
mechanism at work, we need to
understand why people hold a particular
set of values.
Parents play an important role in
instilling values in their children. This is
exemplified by the fact that a US citizen
tends to provide the same answer to the
question about claiming benefits as
CentrePiece Autumn 2009
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Figure 1:
Correlation between unemployment insurance generosity and the
values held in a country (as measured by the probability of finding
it ‘never justifiable’ to cheat on benefits)
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Note: France taken as
reference, for example,
being British rather than
French increases the
probability of answering
‘never justifiable’ by
24%. Data source: OECD
and World Values Survey
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someone from his ancestors’ country of
origin (Algan and Cahuc, 2009). More
generally, the transmission of values from
one generation to the next can either be
vertical – from parents to their children –
or oblique – from other individuals of the
parental generation to children. 
Recent research suggests that cultural
transmission is not something
spontaneous; rather, it results from the
optimising behaviour of parents who
weigh the benefits and costs of
transmitting desirable values to their
children (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). The
expansion of the scope and size of the
unemployment benefits system that
occurred after the Second World War
decreased the returns from having a
strong work ethic, and this meant that
parents put less effort into raising their
children to work hard.
In addition, it is possible that some
rebellious young individuals, reluctant to
learn from their parents, might have been
attracted by the lifestyle of those living off
benefits for extended periods of time.
The drop in values from one
generation to the next was probably
magnified by the fact that those of the
parental generation survived the Second
World War. Many of these people would
have been willing to risk their life for their
nation, and were particularly reluctant to
cheat on government-provided benefits.
Using the World Values Survey, I look
at whether the work ethic has
deteriorated over time. The challenge is
that the data were only collected since the
1980s. The solution is to work with ‘birth
cohorts’ – generations of individuals born
in the same year. We would expect
individuals born before the Second World
War to have a stronger work ethic than
those born after.
As Figure 2 shows, the later people are
born, the less likely they are to say that it
is ‘never justified’ to cheat the benefit
system. This is true after filtering out the
effects of age, gender, political
orientation, education, religion and
nationality. Using the 1930s as a
benchmark, for a person with average
characteristics, being born in the 1960s
rather than in the 1930s decreases the
probability of answering ‘never justifiable’
by 12%. There has recently been an
acceleration in the decline with the
corresponding probability reaching 19%
and 24% for those born in the 1970s 
and 1980s, respectively.
The trend over time is of comparable
magnitude to the effect of nationality and
much more important than other factors
such as gender or education. Men are
slightly less likely to answer ‘never
CentrePiece Autumn 2009
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Figure 2:
Impact of decade of birth on the probability of thinking that it is
‘never justifiable’ to cheat on government-provided benefits
Note: Individuals born in the 1930s taken as
reference group, that is, their marginal effect is
set equal to zero (for example, being born in
the 1960s, rather than the 1930s, decreases the
probability of answering ‘never justifiable’ by
12%). Data source: World Values Survey.
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The later people are born, the
less likely they are to say that 
it is ‘never justified’ to cheat the
benefit system
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justifiable’ than women but the difference
is small, only 3%. The more educated you
are, the more you believe that it is ‘never
justifiable’ to cheat on benefits, but again
the effect is minor: university educated
people are only 1% more likely to answer
that it is ‘never justifiable’ to cheat on
benefits than people who left school as
soon as they could.
This decline in the work ethic could be
one of the major factors explaining the
evolution of European unemployment since
1945. When workers from the baby boom
generation entered the labour market in
the 1970s, they had a weaker work ethic
than their parents and the moral hazard
problem of unemployment benefits
became much more severe.
This led to an increase in the number
of people living off unemployment benefits
for extended periods of time. In other
words, the rise in European unemployment
can be explained by a generation-long lag
between the introduction (or expansion) of
unemployment benefits and the
behavioural response of workers.
Changes in values may also explain the
decline in European unemployment prior
to the recession. As the share of people
willing to cheat on benefits increased,
providing generous unemployment
benefits became ever more expensive. 
So governments were forced to curtail the
level of benefits relative to wages. This
created an incentive for the new
generation of workers to look for work.
Recently, European countries have
tried to monitor the unemployed to ensure
that they are looking for work, alongside
an expansion of active labour market
policies designed to help workers find
jobs. Both of these developments certainly
contributed to the reduction in the
number of jobless in Europe.
A decline in the work ethic is arguably
one of the key factors behind the
evolution of European unemployment
since the Second World War. It explains
why policies that have not changed much
over time (such as unemployment
benefits) have had distinctly different
effects over time. This study suggests that
policy-makers should not neglect the
potential impact that their policies could
have on the transmission of values from
one generation to the next.
This article summarises ‘Unemployment
Insurance and Cultural Transmission:
Theory and Application to European
Unemployment’ by Jean-Baptiste Michau,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 936
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0936.pdf).
Jean-Baptiste Michau is a researcher in
CEP’s macroeconomics programme.
Further reading
Yann Algan and Pierre Cahuc (2009) 
‘Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions’,
American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics 1(1): 111-45.
Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier (2001) 
‘The Economics of Cultural Transmission and
the Dynamics of Preferences’, Journal of
Economic Theory 97: 298-319.
Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers (2000)
‘The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the
Rise of European Unemployment:
The Aggregate Evidence’, Economic Journal
110: C1-C33.
More generous benefits may
have meant that parents did
not bring up their children to
be hard workers
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Shared capitalism:
does it work?
Shared capitalism – in which firms reward employees on
the basis of the performance of their enterprise or
workplace – has traditionally been viewed as a niche part
of the economy. Famous names – John Lewis in the UK,
Mondragon in Spain and, at one point, the US company
United Airlines – might operate in this way, but they are
thought to be unusual organisations.
Our analysis shows that in the UK, the United States and
elsewhere in the advanced countries, shared capitalist
arrangements have increased way beyond niche status.
Today, more employees have a bigger financial stake in
their firms than ever before.
In the United States, 44% of employees have part of their
pay linked to company performance, either through
ownership, stock options, profit-sharing or gain-sharing. In
the UK, one fifth of private sector workplaces have share
ownership schemes covering one third of employees.
Some of the growth in share ownership in the UK over the
past quarter century is attributable to tax privileges for
firms that pay staff with ownership stakes. But some of the
growth is also part of a movement towards giving
employees more effective incentives through collective
forms of pay.
Despite the United Airlines bankruptcy, overall employee
ownership in the United States has not fallen. And in the
UK, an increasing number of firms, some with very
different ownership models, have joined the Employee
Ownership Association, which represents the growing co-
owned sector.
Is this any good for the economy? The narrowest view of
worker behaviour says it can’t be. Workers will ‘free-ride’
on the backs of others instead of trying harder because of
the financial incentive. And under UK tax law, employees
have to hold onto shares for three years before they benefit
from the tax breaks: shares can go down as well as up.
What’s more, worker effort and activity is only one factor
influencing a company’s performance. And aside from top
executives, few employees have sizeable holdings that give
them both a large financial stake and an influence on
decision-making. 
But share ownership and other forms of shared capitalism
are large and growing. So do they really lead to better
performance? 
Isolating the effects of share ownership on performance
through economic analysis is tricky. Firms do not choose
the schemes randomly. Share capitalist companies may be
those that have identified benefits in sharing the rewards
of good performance with their employees, while other
firms may have chosen to be ‘lean and mean’ because that
pays off for them. In addition, many believe that firms with
share schemes have more sophisticated managements and
it is the leadership that really matters, not the scheme.
But two recent studies find that shared capitalism works
for UK firms beyond the fabled John Lewis. The first,
commissioned by HM Treasury, is the largest study of share
ownership ever undertaken in the UK.
Linking administrative data from HM Revenue and
Customs records to company performance data, the
Treasury study finds that ‘on average, across the whole
sample, the effect of tax-advantaged share schemes is
significant and increases productivity by 2.5% in the long
run’. The analysis also finds that ‘there are further benefits
to be gained from operating several types of schemes’.
And schemes chosen by firms without tax advantages tend
to pay off more than those with tax breaks (Oxera, 2007).
Our research, which analyses data from the 2004
Workplace Employment Relations Survey, finds positive
effects of share ownership on workplace productivity, with
the effects being much more pronounced when shared
capitalist schemes are deployed in combination. Share
ownership has the clearest positive association with
productivity, but its impact is largest when combined with
other forms of shared capitalist pay. 
Employee share ownership and other forms of ‘shared capitalism’ are large
and growing. Alex Bryson and Richard Freeman ask whether it leads to
better performance.
in brief...
Today, more employees
have a bigger financial
stake in their firms than
ever before
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Our findings mirror results from the United States in the
2000s. Researchers at the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) have surveyed tens of thousands of
workers about what makes shared capitalism work more or
less effectively. They find that shared capitalism improves
outcomes both for companies and their staff. For example,
owning company stock strongly predicts both a culture of
innovation and a willingness to engage in innovative
activity (Kruse et al, forthcoming).
We have learned a lot about shared capitalist schemes as a
result of this research but much remains to be understood.
Firms often change the specific schemes they use. The
schemes also appear to have larger positive effects in some
sectors and firms than in others (though there is almost no
evidence of any negative effects).
Neither we nor the authors of the Treasury-sponsored
study feel sufficiently confident in the magnitudes of the
estimated effects to assess whether the tax privileges 
given to shared capitalist arrangements are socially
optimal. And neither we nor the NBER researchers feel
sufficiently confident that we have identified the right
mix of schemes and other policies that guarantees
success with shared capitalism.
But taken together, the growth of shared capitalist 
forms of pay and the research evidence that it pays off for
both firms and employees give a picture that diverges
greatly from the old view that this is just a small niche
within capitalism. Shared capitalism works in the UK
outside John Lewis. And it works in the United States and
many other economies too.
Given the fundamental problem of ‘free-riding’ that shared
capitalism must surmount to succeed, how do firms and
workers manage to produce positive economic outcomes?
There are two ways firms overcome this incentive problem:
through workers monitoring other workers (see Kruse 
et al); and through the creation of corporate culture that
inculcates workers with a team orientation.
This article summarises ‘How Does Shared Capitalism Affect
Economic Performance in the UK?’ by Alex Bryson and
Richard Freeman, CEP Discussion Paper No. 885
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0885.pdf).
Alex Bryson of the National Institute for Economic and Social
Research is a visiting research fellow in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Richard Freeman of Harvard University is a
senior research fellow in CEP’s wellbeing and labour markets
programmes.
Further reading
Douglas Kruse, Richard Freeman and Joseph Blasi
(forthcoming) Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee
Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock
Options, University of Chicago Press.
Oxera (2007) ‘Tax-advantaged Employee Share Schemes:
Analysis of Productivity Effects’, HM Revenue and Customs
Research Report No. 33.
Shared capitalism works in the UK outside 
John Lewis – and it works in the United States
and many other economies too
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Firms in declining
industries have
stronger incentives to
lobby for protection
than firms in
expanding industries
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G
overnments that try to pick
winners and losers usually
choose the latter. Some of
the clearest examples of
this come from trade
policy. In the United States and Europe, the
most protected sectors – agriculture,
textiles, clothing, footwear, steel and
shipbuilding – have all been in decline for
decades. Likewise, one of the few policies
of the Bush administration that President
Obama is not breaking with is in keeping
the US car industry alive ‘a high priority’.
Counter-examples are rare. Even when
a growing sector gets protection, as the US
semiconductor industry did, the protection
tends to be focused on market segments –
like memory chips – in which the domestic
industry is losing ground.
There are a few reasons for protecting
‘losers’, two of which may make some
economic sense. The first is that the losers
of today might be the winners of
tomorrow: these ‘infant industries’ need
protection while they mature before they
can successfully compete with the world
leaders. These are industries like
biotechnology or semiconductors, where
accumulated learning and experience are
important drivers of productivity.
But picking potential winners is
difficult in practice. And governments
seem much better at protecting ‘national
champions’ – sunset sectors like Detroit’s
car industry or Italy’s flagship airline,
Alitalia – than dynamic industries. In
contrast, ‘the market does a great job of
rewarding the very best and cutting the
rest down to size’ (Harford, 2008).
A second justification for protecting
losers is one of ‘insurance’ – a desire to
protect the least well-off. But in developed
nations, governments have many policies
for redistributing income and protecting
the worst-off (such as income taxes,
unemployment benefits and retraining
schemes). So we should separate industry
support from considerations of income
distribution. After all, we care about
people not corporations. 
A third intuitive explanation for
protecting losers is the fact that people
care more about ‘known’ individuals than
unidentified ‘faceless’ individuals. Anne
Krueger (1990) contrasts the impact of a
subsidy to a declining sector with one to
an expanding industry: both will alter the
allocation of employment, but in the ailing
industry the jobs ‘saved’ can be identified
with specific people whereas the jobs
created in the expanding sector cannot.
Unlike the first two explanations, this
‘identity bias’ argument has implications
that are much more consistent with
observed government behaviour. Witness,
for example, the asymmetry in press
coverage and government response
(especially in continental Western Europe)
between a factory that shuts down and
Governments frequently intervene to support domestic
industries, but a surprising amount of this support 
goes to ailing sectors. Frédéric Robert-Nicoud and
Richard Baldwin explain why.
Industrial 
policy:
why governments
pick losers
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lays off a few hundred workers and the
thousands of jobs being created daily in
dynamic industries that go unnoticed.
But an important criticism of the
identity bias argument is that it does not
explain why certain sectors are more
successful in attracting government
support than others. In the 1980s, the real
wages of US unskilled workers fell
substantially but only a small subset of
these, including apparel workers,
managed to win government support.
Understanding these facts becomes
easier if we take a more cynical view of
the way policies are shaped. In our
research, we use the proliferation of
pressure groups to account for the
surprising amount of support that goes to
declining industries. 
Pressure groups are ubiquitous. 
There are an estimated fifteen to twenty
thousand lobbyists in Brussels. In the
United States in 1999, 3,835 political
action committees were registered and
over eleven thousand general interest
groups, companies and associations
engaged representatives in Washington,
DC (www.opensecrets.org; Grossman and
Helpman, 2001).
Some of the activities of these groups
may be beneficial: they can relay complex
information from experts to legislators and
senior civil servants. But it is also clear that
such groups are equally successful at
bringing home what Americans call ‘pork’.
Our basic story is simple. Government
policy is influenced by pressure groups
who engage in expensive lobbying. Special
interest groups spend money in return for
favours that benefit their bottom line
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994). But
contracting industries have much more to
gain from retaining lobbyists than
expanding industries.
In an expanding industry, a given firm
cannot successfully retain the benefits
from lobbying as new firms will enter the
market and compete away any profitable
opportunities. This is not true in declining
industries. Since there are costs that are
‘sunk’ when a firm enters the market
(such as unrecoverable investments in
product development, training and brand
name advertising), new entrants will not
be able to compete away profitable
opportunities as easily.
The result is that losers lobby harder.
So it is not government policy that picks
losers but rather that losers pick
government policies. This may also explain
why special interest groups fight harder to
avoid losses than they do to win gains.
One key ingredient in our story is that
lobbying is costly. Some sectors might
overcome these costs and organise more
easily than others. In particular, sectors
with only few firms should find it easier to
prevent one firm from ‘free-riding’ on the
lobbying efforts of others than sectors
with a plethora of small firms. Recent US
evidence suggests that all things being
equal, sectors that have few large firms
get more protection than others
(Bombardini, 2008).
The other key ingredient in our story is
that there are entry costs that are 
‘sunk’ and not recoverable on exit. 
When these sunk costs are investments in
human capital, this also explains why
workers with skills specific to ailing
industries lobby harder (for example,
farmers and car workers).
Our analysis sheds light on the
undesirability of packaging protectionist
policies with policies discouraging entry
from competitors (such as a government
monopoly or production quotas). Such
packaging is likely to lead to greater levels
of protection because it increases the
incentives of all industries to lobby 
for protection. 
In addition, when some of the entry
costs are created by regulation and red
tape, special interest groups that manage
to keep such regulations in place need not
be losers. Taxi drivers in the big cities of
the world are an example. How else to
explain how a New York taxi licence hit
the record price of US$600,000 in May
2007? If entry were free, the licence
would be worthless. 
Government policy doesn’t
pick losers: losers pick
government policies
Protectionist
packages that
place controls on
domestic entry
or production
are likely to
attract greater
lobbying efforts
This article summarises ‘Entry and
Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments
Pick Losers’ by Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
and Richard Baldwin, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 791 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0791.pdf) and subsequently
published in the Journal of the European
Economic Association 5(5): 1064-93,
September 2007.
Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, who is at the
University of Geneva and a Peter Kenen
Fellow at Princeton, is a research affiliate in
CEP’s globalisation programme.
Richard Baldwin, who is at the Graduate
Institute, Geneva, is policy director of the
Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Further reading
Matilde Bombardini (2008) ‘Firm
Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation’,
Journal of International Economics 75(2):
329-48.
Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman
(1994) ‘Protection for Sale’, American
Economic Review 84, 833-50.
Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman
(2001) Special Interest Politics, MIT Press.
Tim Harford (2008) ‘Rewarding Mediocrity’,
Forbes.com, 29 January
(http://www.forbes.com/business/2008/01/29/
national-champions-economics-
biz-champions08-cx_th_0129harford.html).
Anne Krueger (1990) ‘Asymmetries in Policy
between Exportables and Import-competing
Goods’, in Ronald Jones and Anne Krueger
(eds) The Political Economy of International
Trade, Basil Blackwell.
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While most OECD countries have 
laws prohibiting cartels that prevent 
new production and entry, in certain
industries, such as medicine and law, 
the special interest group itself regulates
the flow of new entrants. In many
countries, the airline industry regulator
and the flagship airline seem to be
indistinguishable in practice.
Unions can play a similar role: those
that are able to control the wages of new
workers benefit from higher tariffs in both
contracting and expanding industries. 
In fact, many countries have sanctioned
‘closed shop’ rules that have had exactly
this effect. France protects its energy
market from foreign competitors (in
violation of European Union rules). In this
case, the unions of its national giant, EDF,
managed to secure wages at a much
higher level than the national average –
that is, to capture a share of the profits
being created by limited entry that usually
accrue to shareholders. 
The recent US ‘cash-for-clunkers’
policy and the government loans to
Chrysler and GM can also be understood
as ultimately helping a key constituency of
the Democrats: the members of the
United Auto Workers union. 
So protectionist packages that place
controls on domestic entry or production
are likely to attract greater lobbying efforts
– which is worse for society as a whole. If
governments refrain from packaging trade
policy with policy that (in effect) regulates
entry, protectionism should be reduced.
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More than 400,000 Finns were forced to leave their
homes as a result of the Soviet invasion in 1939.
Research by Matti Sarvimäki and colleagues finds
evidence of a surprisingly positive impact on the
economic outcomes of the displaced people more than
three decades later.
The unexpected 
consequences 
of forced migration
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A
few hours after the 
Soviet aircraft had
attacked the Finnish
village of Kiviniemi on 
30 November 1939, a
messenger arrived at the Uosukainen
family farm. He commanded the women
and children to make their way to the
train station and said that everyone was
allowed to bring just one suitcase, nothing
more. Mrs Uosukainen packed in haste,
climbed onto a sleigh with her children
and sister, and rode to the station.1
They were not alone. More than a
tenth of the Finnish population was
permanently displaced during the Second
World War as the eastern parts of the
country were ceded to the Soviet Union.
At the time, Finland was a middle-
income developing country by today’s
standards. It had won independence just
two decades earlier, gone through a short
but brutal civil war and then evolved into
a reasonably well functioning democracy.
Half of the population was working in
agriculture, typically owning small farms
and working as hired labour in forestry
during the winter.
When the war ended, the country of
four million had suffered relatively minor
civilian casualties. But 92,000 men had
died in battle and more than 200,000
were injured. Much of the production
capacity was destroyed and large war
reparations were due. On top of this,
430,000 people were displaced.
To cope with the situation, the Finnish
parliament decided that the displaced
people would be compensated for their
lost property, financing the compensation
by levying a massive tax on capital.
Displaced people in urban areas received
compensation in government bonds, while
displaced farmers were given agricultural
land. Since the amount of publicly owned
land available was insufficient, half of the
distributed fields were expropriated from
private farmers living in their farms. 
In 1950, the Uosukainen family had
another visitor. This time the matter was
far less dramatic: Finland was conducting
its first full census and the man was there
to help fill in the questionnaire.
The census form included a large set
of questions about the family’s current
situation as well as retrospective questions
on the pre-war municipality of residence,
socio-economic status and industry. The
answers were then coded to punch cards
and transformed to reports published
during the next eight years. The original
forms were sorted by municipality,
archived into boxes and largely forgotten.
Fifty years later, Statistics Finland drew
1 The recollection of Mrs Uosukainen’s daughter is available in Finnish at:
http://www.sakkola.fi/tarinat/uosukainen-1.htm
Finnish men
displaced 
by the war earned
substantially
more in later life
than otherwise
similar men who
were not forced
to migrate
a sample of every tenth box of the
original census forms. Most of the
information was keyed into a database.
These data were then merged with later
censuses, creating a large dataset that
follows a random sample of the Finnish
population and their children for more
than six decades. 
Our research uses a subset of these
data to study the long-term effects of
displacement on those forced to migrate.
We focus on the cohorts born between
1907 and 1925 – those who were at least
14 years old at the beginning of the war
and still of working age in 1971, when we
first observe their tax records.
Analysis of these data shows that the
pre-war economic status of those who
later became displaced was similar to the
rest of the population. But more than three
decades later, the displaced men were
earning substantially more than otherwise
similar men who had not been forced to
migrate. This result survives a battery of
checks for robustness, so we interpret it as
indicating a causal relationship. 
What happened? According to our
research, the most likely answer is that
forced migration increased people’s
mobility both in terms of geography 
and occupation. Of course, the 
displaced were geographically mobile
during the war. Less obviously, they were
more likely to move from traditional to
modern occupations. They also remained
geographically more mobile 
even after resettlement.
Most of these migrations were from
the countryside to the cities. This capacity
to adapt to the changing circumstances
turned out to be valuable in the rapidly
urbanising and industrialising post-war
Finland – at least for men. While the
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crofters (tenants of very small farms), who
wanted the right to buy the land they
were renting. And the resettlement of the
displaced was fiercely debated in the
Finnish parliament, with representatives of
the Swedish-speaking parts of the country
managing to exempt their constituencies
from giving up virtually any land.
In short, the resettlement policies were
not implemented as a consequence of
Finland being an exceptionally harmonious
society. Rather, pragmatism and fear of
further unrest are the most likely
explanation for these policies.
Our results also point towards a
broader lesson about the importance of
mobility. While economists have long
argued that the returns to migration are
positive and potentially large, hard
evidence has been scarce.
The reason is that migrants are
typically a highly self-selected group.
Hence correlations between migrant status
and economic outcomes are not likely to
be informative about the causal effect of
migration. Since we are able to study the
impact of migration in a ‘quasi-
experimental’ setting, this selection
problem does not occur. 
Of course, one should not extrapolate
too freely from these results to current
policy debates. Yet, the results are
consistent with the argument that policies
promoting mobility – both in terms of
occupation and geography – are likely to
promote growth.
estimates for urbanisation among 
women are comparable to those of men,
we find no impact on income. This
suggests that later migrations were likely
to be driven by the labour market
considerations of husbands.
Our findings illustrate that while forced
migrations can be tragic, good policies can
prevent the displaced becoming an
impoverished underclass. The Finnish policy
consisted of providing land and monetary
compensation for lost property. Those
given land were free to sell it. Everyone
remained free to choose where to live. So
the policy provided the means to start over
but did not lock the displaced into
traditional work.
It may be tempting to think that such
policies were possible only in a country
with a homogenous population and well
functioning institutions. But it is not
evident that Finland was such a country in
the 1940s.
For example, one of the reasons for
the civil war in 1918 was a dispute about
land, notably between landowners and
This article summarises ‘Long-term Effects of
Forced Migration’ by Matti Sarvimäki,
Roope Uusitalo and Markus Jäntti, Discussion
Paper No. 15 of the Spatial Economics
Research Centre (SERC) at LSE
(http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/textonly/
SERC/publications/download/sercdp0015.pdf).
Matti Sarvimäki is a research economist at
SERC and CEP. Roope Uusitalo is at the
Government Institute for Economic Research
in Helsinki. Markus Jäntti is at Stockholm
University.
Policies to promote
occupational and
geographical mobility are
likely to be good for
economic growth
While forced migrations can be
tragic, good policies can prevent the
displaced becoming an
impoverished underclass
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Government regulation 
of occupations
The regulation of occupations has a long and varied
history. Among the oldest evidence of rules governing
occupations is the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, 
which stipulates both the fees that patients were obliged
to pay for medical services and the punishments that
practitioners faced for negligent treatment. And in The
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith commented on the ability
of the crafts to lengthen apprenticeship programmes and
limit the number of apprentices per master, thus ensuring
higher earnings for people in those professions.
In modern times, occupational regulation has become
pervasive in western industrialised nations. In the United
States, for example, the proportion of workers whose
occupation requires them to have a licence from the
government to perform their work has grown nearly six-
fold during the last 50 years to reach about 29% of the
workforce. Adding in people whose occupation involves
some kind of government certification means that about
38% of the workforce has some permission requirements
from the government to work for pay.
Earlier this year, a symposium at CEP explored the role
that governments and non-profit organisations play in
precluding individuals from working in an occupation for
pay. It also examined whether occupational regulations
provide higher quality services and greater health and
safety benefits, as well as eliminating consumer
uncertainty about the services.
Building on the strong industrial relations tradition of
multidisciplinary interactions between academics and
practitioners, the symposium included scholars from
industrial relations, economics, public policy and sociology
as well as practitioners and officials from the Council on
Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation (CLEAR), an
international organisation of occupational regulation
professionals.
The papers ranged from analyses of national-level
occupational licensing institutions to specific issues within
specific occupations – and from an analysis of the avenues
for enforcing occupational regulation of the offshoring of
radiology in different countries to access to care within a
country’s dental profession. This diversity underscores the
complexity of the globalisation of occupational regulation
and the need for fresh analytical approaches to a topic
that is at the core of labour market regulation.
Occupational licensing in 
the United States
In the 1950s, one in 20 US workers were required to have
a licence from an agency of the US government to be able
to do their job. A paper by Morris Kleiner and Alan
Krueger finds that in 2006, the proportion was nearing
one in three workers. Occupational regulation in the
United States now affects many times more workers than
unionisation, which encompasses roughly 12% of the
workforce. Moreover, the effect of licensing on wages –
raising them by around 15% – is similar to the impact of
unions on wages. 
A paper by Joseph Hotz and Mo Xiao examines childcare
provision in the United States and finds that the effects of
state-level quality standards that specify the labour
intensiveness of childcare services are strikingly different
from those that specify staff qualifications. Requirements
for higher staff-child ratios deter entry of new providers
and reduce the number of operating childcare
establishments. Requirements for higher staff educational
qualifications do not deter new entry, but they do have
the unintended effects of discouraging accreditation,
reducing owners’ profits and driving firms out of business.
Comparison of cross-national approaches to occupational
regulation is a key issue in the internationalisation of
work. A paper by Kyoung-Hee Yu and Frank Levy
examines variations in a specific case – the offshoring of
diagnostic radiology in Singapore, the UK and the United
States – to show how differences in national institutions
continue to affect market transactions of professional
services in a globalised world.
All three countries are offshoring diagnostic radiological
readings, but primarily for reasons other than cost. The
United States offshores radiology to US board-certified
radiologists who are located abroad. The UK offshores
radiology largely to radiologists trained in other European
Union (EU) countries. But only Singapore of the three
countries offshores any significant amount of work to India. 
Occupational regulation in the
European Union
In contrast with the long history of research on
occupational licensing in North America and the detailed
data that are available there, there has been relatively little
examination of occupational licensing in the EU.
Occupational licensing – where working for pay in an occupation (such as teaching,
dentistry, accountancy and the law) requires government permission – is a growing
phenomenon. Alex Bryson and Morris Kleiner organised a symposium at CEP to
explore the impact on earnings, employment and access to services.
in brief...
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A paper by Francis Kramarz and colleagues examines the
influence of the abolition of compulsory conscription (the
draft) in France on the acquisition of driving licences by
young men (something that had been effectively subsidised
through their acquisition while in the army) and the effects
on both labour supply and the demand for driving
instructors. The results show that abolition of the draft
resulted in increased rents for driving instructors because
heavy entry regulations ensured that demand for driving
instructors outstripped supply.
A paper by David Metcalf discusses how in the UK, policies
are being adopted on immigration that take into account
the relative supply and demand aspects of the occupation.
Moreover, occupations regularly lobby to limit the numbers
within the occupation in government agencies. 
Case studies
Occupational regulation influences wages, employment and
consumers differently depending on the stage and level of
regulation. For example, funeral directors in the United
States are required to learn practices such as embalming
that are used infrequently, but are expensive in terms of
both money and time to master. The result, according to a
paper by Alison Cathles and colleagues, is a reduction in
the supply of female practitioners and an increase in the
earnings of funeral directors. Similarly, a paper by Tanya
Wanchek shows that the number of hygienists is limited by
state laws that reduce consumers’ access to dental care, but
raise the earnings of this female-dominated occupation.
A key overarching aspect for the labour market is the
influence of occupational licensing on wage determination.
A paper by Mario Pagliero finds that for US attorneys, more
difficult state-by-state exams directly translate into higher
salaries for lawyers. Similarly, a paper by Robert Thornton
and Edward Timmons shows that for barbers in the United
States, tougher statutory restrictions for barbers are
associated with higher salaries.
Policy implications
The papers presented at the symposium support the
interpretation that occupational licensing serves as a means
to enforce entry barriers to a profession that raise wages
and reduce employment without any demonstrable
benefits to consumers. For occupations to continue to be
licensed or for licensing of occupations that are currently
unlicensed, it must be shown that they are enhancing
consumer well-being.
The estimates of the relationship between occupational
licensing and wages is consistent with the idea that
members of an occupation raise wages by using the powers
of government to drive up requirements and capture work
for the regulated workers. These estimates suggest a strong
role for the monopoly face of licensing in the labour
market. Indeed, the wage premium associated with
licensing is strikingly similar to that found in studies of the
effect of unions on wages.
This article summarises the issues and papers
discussed at ‘The International Symposium on the
Government Regulation of Occupations’, jointly
organised by CEP and the British Journal of Industrial
Relations and held at CEP in March 2009
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/events/event.asp?id=66).
Alex Bryson of the National Institute of Economic and
Social Research is a visiting research fellow in CEP’s
labour markets programme. Morris Kleiner of the
University of Minnesota is the author of Licensing
Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting
Competition?, Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research (2006).
Occupational licensing
introduces entry
barriers to a profession
that raise wages and
reduce employment
In 1993, the Finnish Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation established
the Yrjö Jahnsson Award in Economics, for a young
(under 45) European economist who has made a
contribution in theoretical and applied research that is
significant to economics in Europe.
The Award is given every two years in cooperation with
the European Economic Association (EEA) and previous
winners include Tim Besley, Richard Blundell and 
Jean Tirole (see: http://www.yjs.fi/index_eng.cfm?rID=
2&lgID=2&tID=33). This year the recipients were
announced at a ceremony at the annual congress of 
the EEA in Barcelona in late August.
The citation from the Board of the Yrjö Jahnsson
Foundation, which nominated John Van Reenen 
and former CEP researcher Fabrizio Zilibotti (now 
at the University of Zurich) as recipients of the 2009
award, said:
‘John Van Reenen and Fabrizio Zilibotti, both on their
own and in joint work, have made several important
contributions to the analysis of technological innovation
and its link with economic growth and labour market
phenomena’.
‘The work of Van Reenen and Zilibotti addresses very
relevant questions, with rich policy implications, using a
diversity of research styles and methods, but always with
the highest standards of rigour and excellence.’
The Award recognises the broad scope and impact of
Professor Van Reenen’s research on the world of work
and business (detailed on his home page here:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/staff/person.asp?id=1358):
‘John Van Reenen has made several contributions to the
empirical analysis of labour markets, competition policy
and industrial economics, especially in areas relating to
productivity growth, management practices, R&D,
intellectual property, and investment decisions.’
‘He has also done pioneering work on the organizational
structure of the firm and its relation to innovation,
contributing both with empirical evidence and
measurement tools.’ 
Professor Van Reenen’s research on management
practices is discussed in the ‘Bossonomics’ article starting
on page 10 of this issue of CentrePiece and in Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007). Some of his research on productivity
in both the private and public sectors is written up in
Faggio et al (2007) and Hall et al (2008). And work on
technology and the organisational structure of the firm is
described in Acemoglu et al (2007) and Bloom et al
(2009).
Professor Van Reenen said: ‘I am deeply honoured to
receive this award. It belongs more to the wonderful
colleagues and students I have been so lucky to have
worked with over the years.’
Further reading
Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Claire Lelarge, John Van
Reenen and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2007) ‘Technology, Information
and the Decentralization of the Firm’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 122(4): 1759-99.
Nick Bloom, Luis Garicano, Raffaella Sadun and John Van
Reenen (2009) ‘The Distinct Effects of Information Technology
and Communication Technology on Firm Organization’,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 927.
Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen (2007) ‘Measuring and
Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Nations’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4): 1351-1408.
Giulia Faggio, Kjell Salvanes and John Van Reenen (2007) 
‘The Evolution of Inequality in Productivity and Wages: Panel
Data Evidence’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 821.
Emma Hall, Carol Propper and John Van Reenen (2008) 
‘Can Pay Regulation Kill? The Impact of Labour Markets and
Skills on Hospital Productivity’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 843.
Europe’s top prize 
for economic research
John Van Reenen, CEP director and LSE professor,
has been jointly awarded the Yrjö Jahnsson Award
in Economics 2009, Europe’s most prestigious prize
for economic researchers.
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